

Cultural Policy as Development Policy: Evidence from the United States

Dr. Elizabeth Strom
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Joseph C. Cornwall
Center for Metropolitan Studies
Faculty of Arts and Sciences
Rutgers University
Newark Campus

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This study was carried out under a research grant from the Cornwall Center for Metropolitan Studies at Rutgers-Newark. Dr. Elizabeth Strom is a faculty member in the Department of Political Science at Rutgers-Newark. All correspondence should be directed to: Dr. Elizabeth Strom, Department of Political Science, Rutgers University, 360 Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Blvd. Newark, NJ 07102, Phone: 973-353-5988, Email: estrom@andromeda.rutgers.edu.

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Abstract

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Cultural policies and cultural projects in the United States have been reframed to emphasize their economic benefits to cities. New alliances between arts advocates and place promoters are apparent at all levels, but are most prominent locally. These new alliances are facilitated by the changing interests of local officials and businesspeople, who have come to believe there is economic value in the arts, and of arts administrators, for whom attracting broader public support has become imperative. In some cities, entirely new organizational structures have sprung up to plan and implement projects that serve cultural and economic development advocates simultaneously. Such new institutions are most prominent in more economically disadvantaged cities.

Arts institutions have long been located in city centres, but over the past two decades the construction and expansion of cultural facilities in North American and European cities has been undertaken as an explicit part of an urban development strategy. This co-mingling of arts and local economic revitalization builds on earlier traditions of civic promotion but represents a new, intensified reframing of arts policies and their role in the larger community. This reframing of cultural policies has been furthered by local officials, who seek to attract tourists and investors by improving their city's image; by cultural organizations, who hope to position themselves as broadly beneficial civic actors; and by business promotion groups who hope to boost local economic activity through association with the arts. These new linkages are not merely discursive: rather, they are realized through new organizational alliances and supported by new funding streams.

This article considers the emergence new, local alliances in US cities that encourage construction for the arts as a tool of urban development. Examining the US generally, and the cities of Newark (New Jersey), Philadelphia and Seattle in greater detail, it illuminates those factors that explain the adoption by both local cultural policy advocates and economic development promoters of a "culture as development" framework. In the three case cities, like countless others, city officials, cultural institutions, and economic stakeholders have coalesced behind the development of major concert halls, viewing these projects explicitly as downtown revitalization strategies. In spite of these similarities, the "culture as development" policy area has varied from city to city, marked by different organizational forms. In some cases, existing institutions have been well-positioned to move into this new policy area; in others, new organizations

have been created to forge the needed business-cultural linkages. The article concludes by considering the factors that account for the different patterns found in each city.

Although this article focuses on the marriage of the arts and economic development in American cities, no doubt parallel policy alliances can be found in those European cities where cultural projects have been built with the goal of boosting the local economy (Bianchini 1993; Fisher and Owen 1991).

“CULTURE AS DEVELOPMENT”: THE VIEW FROM THE CITY

Efforts to reframe cultural support as investment policy can be found on the national level, as arts advocates have sought to move away from the ideologically charged battles over public funding for allegedly “obscene” art by stressing the educational and economic value of cultural programs (Wyszomirski 1995). But it is at the local level that new discourses on the role of culture, and new organizational alliances championing such views, are most apparent, in part because such approaches have great appeal to public and private sector urban elites. Today’s urban economies no longer centre on the attraction and retention of manufacturing firms; in many cases they have even lost their competitive advantages for office-based service industries. Instead, urban officials have invested in recreation and consumption activities, including everything from shopping malls, often given a sort of urban flair; to baseball stadiums and basketball arenas; to museums and performance centres (Hannigan 1998). Eager to improve a city’s image and also attract tourists, public and private sector leaders plans arts festivals and cultural fairs; in Europe cities vie to be named “European City of Culture,” a designation originally intended foster greater cultural community that has since become an important marketing tool (Häußermann and Siebel 1993; Holton 1998).

We can see examples of urban development policies centred on cultural projects in many cities (Strom 2002, Bianchini 1993, Plaza 2000). Newark, Philadelphia and Seattle, the focus of this paper, are among those where major fine arts projects were built with the explicit goal of revitalizing or stabilizing their downtowns. The state of New Jersey, prodded by political and business leaders, backed the construction of a “world class” arts facility in Newark, both to spur development in its largest city and to put the state on the regional cultural map. Philadelphia’s mayor used a considerable amount of political capital to help develop several cultural projects along a stretch of Center City’s South Broad Street he came to dub “Avenue of the Arts.” Seattle’s City Council allocated \$40 million in city funds to help the Symphony build a new concert hall on a forlorn downtown block, and has also supported the moves of the art museum and a regional theatre company to new, downtown locations.

Why do city leaders embrace and often subsidize these projects? Some may be art lovers, but those are probably exceptional. Most think they will help accomplish two goals. First, entertainment is itself an industry, and as cities don’t have many comparative advantages for widget manufacturers or even insurance agencies, they want to build on those industries where they still do have advantages. Cultural advocates have sought to highlight their economic impact, commissioning studies that show how the arts “industry” creates jobs and pumps money into the economy. But the direct economic impact of arts employment is not huge. Even in New York City, the country’s cultural capital, the 1997 Economic Census counted 65,455 people employed in “Arts,

Entertainment and Recreation” – approximately 2% of the workforce. In Philadelphia, about 26,000 people, or 1.5% of the workforce, are employed in this sector.¹

Second, and probably more realistically, urban officials embrace entertainment projects for their indirect benefits. Footloose companies, especially those employing highly educated workers, don’t want to be in cultural wastelands; convention planners prefer cities where there are things to do; individual tourists visit cities with interesting attractions. High culture projects are an important subset of the entertainment industry. They may ultimately have a smaller direct economic impact, but their value as symbols of good taste and excellence may give them a more powerful indirect impact than, say, another Hard Rock Café. Cultural amenities also help create unique, or pseudo-unique identities for cities – every city may indeed have the same Hard Rock Café, but not THIS museum, this piece of public art, this music festival. If cities invest in the infrastructure of culture, economic boosters have learned, they can count on their cultural communities to fill it with distinctive programs.

That cultural amenities have become important economic development and marketing tools is clear when one looks at their embrace by the groups charged with marketing cities to businesses. I studied the websites of public and quasi-public development offices, Chambers of Commerce and other peak business promotion organizations of the 30 largest US cities (see table 1). I found that 15 of the public and quasi-public agencies discuss their city’s cultural amenities – many as part of a larger section on “quality of life,” but 5 quite prominently in sections specifically addressing the local arts

¹ The “Arts, Entertainment and Recreation” in the US Economic Census includes performing arts institutions, museums and historical sites as well as spectator sport, amusement, gambling and recreation enterprises. Cultural employment thus represents just a portion of the jobs reported in this sector. On the other hand, as cultural economists have pointed out, many people who work in the arts are not employed by cultural institutions, so they may be undercounted by the census.

infrastructure. The findings were similar among Chamber of Commerce sites: half mention culture and five give it a prominent position. Of the 24 private business groups identified, 18 have sections on their websites that discuss local cultural offerings, and five feature it prominently. Among the private business groups, those with a downtown focus (e.g. Philadelphia’s Center City District; Seattle’s Downtown Seattle Association) are most likely to devote space to cultural attractions. Business organizations find many formal and informal ways to support local arts groups, and they also use arts events to promote local business -- Greater Philadelphia First, for example, organized business receptions in France and Germany around tours of the Philadelphia Orchestra (Hodos 2002). These findings suggest that economic development and business promotion professionals are likely to view their cities’ arts amenities as part of what would compel a company to invest in their cities.

Table 1: Culture on websites of economic development agencies

	Arts somewhere on website	Arts prominent on website
Public/quasi-public agencies (n=30)	15	5
Chambers of Commerce (n=30)	15	5
Other private groups (n=24)	18	5

CULTURE AS DEVELOPMENT: THE VIEW FROM THE CULTURAL SECTOR

Can a fine arts museum or a symphony hall serve as the fulcrum of a city’s economic development program? After all, as we learn from Paul DiMaggio’s work on cultural organization in late 19th century Boston, or Vera Zolberg’s work on museums and their missions, many of these high cultural institutions had been organized to differentiate

serious from popular art (DiMaggio 1982, Zolberg 1986). While all certainly hoped to draw audiences, their goal had never been to draw the largest possible audience, but to exhibit or perform the most academically sanctioned art to those willing and able to receive it. Such an institution may provide important social bona fides to a city, but it would hardly anchor an economic development project.

How have cultural institutions been transformed from places offering a noncommercial, cleansing opportunity for elites, to places offering a way to improve the municipal bottom line? Over the past generation, U.S. cultural institutions have repositioned themselves in a variety of ways (in many cases spurred by changes in their funding sources), becoming more professionalized, more concerned with public relations and marketing, and more reliant on commercial transactions. Fine arts institutions of all kinds are more dependent on corporate support (although during the 1990s donations from individuals increased more rapidly, thanks to stock market gains), and corporations are more likely to view their contributions as part of their own marketing efforts, insisting that their names and logos get prominent display. Museums gravitate toward the sort of blockbuster exhibitions that corporate sponsors like; they are aware of the greater need to show evidence of audience appeal to public and corporate sponsors through admissions and membership figures.

Their role as urban revitalization vehicles is hardly the only, or the leading factor explaining changes within arts organizations. But such groups, pushed by public and private funders to become more professional, more market-savvy, and more sensitive to their communities, are well-positioned to recognize that they need and benefit from a better economy; that they can contribute to it; and that they can benefit from showing that

they contribute to it. Under these circumstances it is far less of a reach for a museum or concert hall to be seen as an economic asset, and for its leadership to feel comfortable promoting it in that role. Sociologists use the concept of the “organizational field” – a collection of organizations that “constitute a recognized area of institutional life” (DiMaggio and Powell 1983, 148) – a construct that allows us to conceptualize how organizations concerned with similar issues but from a variety of sectors might form some sort of unified system.² Organizations in the same field come to resemble each other, according to DiMaggio and Powell, not only through coercion (e.g. resource-rich organizations demand certain behaviours from dependent organizations), but also because ideas and norms are diffused throughout the field (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). The organizational field of culture underwent a transformation in the 1960s and 1970s in response to changing patronage patterns, away from individuals and toward bureaucratic (foundation, government and corporate) financing (Alexander 1996, Peterson 1986). As part of this transformation, the field has shifted, most notably at the local level, to include organizations that develop and market the city, especially those focused on tourism. These changes, as well as those on-going in city development agencies as they look more toward symbolic capital and “soft” amenities, have led to a further broadening of the organizational field to create links between public and private “place marketers” and cultural organizations. The expansion of the organizational field of culture has led directly to the transformation of local policy communities, as new constellations of actors, championing new practices and discourses, have come to shape policy debates.

² The organizational field is in essence the sociologist’s equivalent to the political scientist’s policy community. The latter concept is narrower, concerned primarily with interactions that are intended to shape policy, whereas the former is equally interested in all relationships.

PERFORMING DOWNTOWN DEVELOPMENT: CULTURAL POLICY

REFRAMING IN THREE CITIES

One would be hard-pressed to find an American city in which some sort of major cultural project was not the centrepiece of a downtown revitalization effort. In many cities, such as the three profiled below, central city development advocates and cultural organizations converged around the construction of performing arts centres.³ The following section will examine the development of new, downtown performing arts centers in Newark, Philadelphia and Seattle exploring the role of arts groups, public officials, and economic development stakeholders formulating each project.⁴ Table 2 provides an overview of these cities and their projects.

Table 2: Overview of cases

	Newark	Philadelphia	Seattle
Name	New Jersey Performing Arts Center (NJPAC)	Kimmel Center for the Performing Arts	Benaroya Hall
Date opened	Fall 1997	Fall 2002	Fall 1998
Cost	\$180 million	\$245 million	\$160 million
Public contribution	\$126 million	\$93 million	\$54 million
Key initiator(s)	1. Governor Kean 2. Mayor James, regional corporate leaders	1. Philadelphia Orchestra 2. Mayor Rendell 3. Governor Ridge 4. Downtown business organizations	1. Seattle Symphony 2. Mayor Rice 3. Regional corporate leaders

³ Art museums have also been the focus of urban development plans, and have been prominent actors in “culture as development” networks. Performing arts centers, however, have been more popular among those looking to revive downtowns. This may be in part because one of the goals of such projects is to create activity outside of business hours. Also, it can take decades to fill a museum with a decent art collection, whereas a performing arts center can be filled with performers the day it opens.

⁴ Much of the material in these case studies is drawn from interviews conducted by the author with business, political and cultural leaders in Newark, Philadelphia and Seattle beginning in 1999.

Newark

Of all three cities, Newark has the least developed cultural scene. This is not surprising: Newark is the smallest and poorest of the group, and its proximity to New York City has created stiff competition for the arts. To be sure, the Newark Museum is internationally renowned (many say better appreciated by museum experts around the world than by its immediate neighbors) both for its collections (it's particularly strong in Tibetan and contemporary American art) and for its far-reaching educational programs. The city was also home to Symphony Hall, originally the Salaam Temple (constructed for the Ancient Arabic Order of Nobles of the Mystic Shrine in 1922), which had served as a performance space since the 1930s. It was home to the New Jersey Symphony Orchestra as well as host to a variety of classical and popular events. The building, however, had become badly deteriorated; the city-owned hall had experienced rapid management turnover and fiscal difficulties since the 1960s. Even in its better years Newark had been a solid working class city whose regional elites gravitated toward cultural offerings in New York.

Indeed, the idea of building a major performing arts centre in the city was born of a governor's desire to create a statewide cultural institution. Newark's mayor and other political and economic stakeholders lobbied the governor, who agreed to build the project in New Jersey's largest city after a consultant endorsed the plan (Strom 1999). The New Jersey Performing Arts Center (NJPAC) opened in 1997, and has been considered a huge success, managing to bring thousands of suburbanites to the city while winning accolades

among local residents for its varied programming and well-regarded educational outreach.

NJPAC has transformed both the city's small cultural policy community and its economic development community. The cultural policy community in the city remains nascent, but it has clearly been invigorated by the attention and resources drawn by NJPAC. After the PAC opened, a dormant Newark Arts Council was brought back to life, although it is primarily a service organization, and it remains peripheral to the city's political life. As the city has no cultural budget to speak of (although it does underwrite some of the operating costs of the Museum), there is little incentive to do institutional local lobbying, in any case.⁵

Changes in the city's downtown development community have been evident as well. The coalition that brought the PAC into being – including city and state officials and regional corporate leaders – came together around the notion of using an arts institution to revive Newark's downtown, and the staffing, programming and mission statement of the PAC embody the goals of that coalition. NJPAC's president is by training and inclination an urban planner and developer; the PAC's board is made up of people whose interest in the city's revitalization equals or exceeds their interest in the arts. NJPAC and its leadership have transformed the local and state cultural community, but their principal impact has been to reposition the city's economic development actors. Shortly after the PAC's successful first season, the main players involved in the centre's creation formed the Newark Alliance, a peak organization including several major corporations and

⁵ The larger groups, namely NJPAC and the Museum, have far better political connections through their directors and trustees, and don't need the fledgling arts council to act on their behalf. They are also active in Artpride New Jersey, a state-wide advocacy group, that among other things works to try to increase the state art council budget, and to force the state to make good on a commitment to create a matching fund for capital contributions.

philanthropists. Additionally, many of these same actors came together to found the New Newark Foundation, a nonprofit development organization that has bought or optioned a great deal of land in the several block area between the performing arts center and the university district, hoping to develop retail and housing appropriate to an arts/university district. Several members of the same group have been pushing the state to underwrite the construction of a new sports arena that will be home to the state's professional hockey and basketball franchises; they have also pressured the city to restructure its economic development agency, replacing it with one with fewer ties to the public sector, and better positioned to carry out entrepreneurial development projects. The successful development of NJPAC has mobilized the city and region's business and philanthropic elite around an urban revitalization project focused on rebuilding the downtown around cultural, educational and recreational amenities.

Philadelphia

Like Newark, Philadelphia has suffered from long-term population decline and job loss. Philadelphia has a larger, better established cultural community than does Newark, although like Newark the city has never been regarded as a cultural capital, and it lives in the shadow of New York to its north and Washington DC to its south (many upper class Philadelphia opera buffs, according to one local arts administrator, view New York's Metropolitan Opera as "their opera company.") The city's cultural infrastructure includes the 125 year old Philadelphia Museum of Art, and the world famous Philadelphia Orchestra, which long shared the 150-year old Academy of Music with the lesser Pennsylvania Ballet and Philadelphia Opera. Since the 1970s, the city's cultural

organizations have been organized into the Greater Philadelphia Cultural Alliance, a now 230-member service and advocacy coalition that includes arts groups from Philadelphia and its suburbs.

The idea that promoting the arts could serve to promote economic development surfaced occasionally throughout the century, but gained momentum with the election of Ed Rendell as mayor in 1991. Several years earlier the Central Philadelphia Development Corporation, a business promotion group primarily representing real estate and banking interests in Center City, had commissioned a study that proposed creating an arts district along South Broad Street, the declining main artery of the business district. At the same time, the Philadelphia Orchestra wanted to build a new concert hall along the avenue; trying to build broader support for what was seen as a narrow, elite-serving project, they touted the economic benefits such an endeavour would bring to the area.

Ed Rendell was elected mayor largely on a platform pledging economic development and fiscal responsibility; he had not shown any particular interest in the city's cultural life. But he quickly bought into the argument that cultural institutions could play a key role in reviving the central city, and adopted the Broad Street cultural district plan as one of the key parts of his revitalization efforts. The arts were an especially appealing package for economic development in the early years of Rendell's mayoralty. Much of his energy went toward trying to restore the city's fiscal health after it came perilously close to bankruptcy the year of his election: he accomplished this largely by cutting services and waging loud, politically costly battles with municipal labour unions (Bissinger 1997). Realizing that you can't campaign for re-election purely on a balanced budget, Rendell no doubt saw the promotion of the arts and other

entertainment venues as a positive, upbeat corollary to the otherwise gloomy tone of his early years in office. His efforts helped transform several cultural and economic development institutions, and gave birth to several new ones. As a result of Rendell's lobbying, the governor committed \$60 million in economic development funds to South Broad Street arts projects, most notably the construction of a new concert hall for the Philadelphia Orchestra now known as the Kimmel Center for the Performing Arts. The concert hall project, which had been stalled for a decade, was finally realized during the Rendell years: a site assembled, an architect chosen, and public and private funds solicited. The new center, named for Sidney Kimmel, a clothing manufacturer who had contributed \$15 million, his first major donation to an arts group, opened in 2001.

Although the orchestra has been a major fundraiser and leader in building the Kimmel Center, it is an independent organization (officially called the Regional Performing Arts Center, or RPAC), whose board is chaired by one of the city's most active real estate developers, and whose first executive director was a lawyer and close Rendell associate.

In addition to RPAC, three other organizations that were to play an important role in creating the culture/economic development nexus came into existence during the Rendell administration. First, Rendell himself created the Avenue of the Arts, Inc, which was to shape the development of the Broad Street cultural district. With a board that was led by Rendell's wife (a lawyer later appointed to a federal judgeship who had a strong personal interest in the arts) and included key members of the city's development and legal community, the nonprofit organization was to coordinate the several development projects on the avenue and promote the cultural district throughout the region.

The Pennsylvania Convention Center opened in 1993. First proposed in the early 1980s, the Center had had difficulty mustering the political support it needed from the state (Adams 1997), and was completed years behind schedule and well over budget. Since it has opened, however, the Convention Center has been very active in promoting cultural initiatives in the city, believing that the availability of easily accessible, high quality cultural programming will help the Center market the city to trade meeting planners. The Center's executive director served on the boards of Avenue of the Arts and the Philadelphia Orchestra, and many of the city's cultural leaders were asked to serve on Convention Center task forces. Finally, the Greater Philadelphia Tourism and Marketing Corporation was founded in 1996. Funded, since 1999, by a 1% addition to the hotel-motel tax collected in the city, this organization markets the region to tourists. Much of its work concerns the promotion of cultural tourism. It contributed funds to the Kimmel Center, offers grants for cultural district marketing, and promotes packages around cultural events.

In addition, several existing institutions have increased their focus on culture as economic development. The Pew Charitable Trusts and the William Penn Foundation, whose extensive grants among Philadelphia arts institutions are all the more important given the dearth of public arts funding in the city, do not explicitly fund groups for their economic impact, but they have become increasingly interested in helping groups work collectively to develop audiences and market their products. Pew underwrote the study that led the city, state and hospitality industry to support the creation of Greater Philadelphia Tourism and Marketing Corporation. Both foundations have funded the Cultural Alliance's joint marketing efforts, supported studies on the economic impact of

arts activities, and convened less formal working groups on cultural tourism. Secondly, the Delaware River Port Authority has become an important funder of cultural groups in Philadelphia and its suburbs. Modelled after the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, the DRPA is authorized through a bi-state (New Jersey and Pennsylvania) compact; it collects tolls on the several Delaware River bridges, using revenues to maintain the roads, subsidize a commuter rail line, and underwrite economic development projects in the region, most notably those along the Camden and Philadelphia waterfronts.⁶ In 2000 the DRPA gave over \$5 million to the Cultural Alliance to re-grant to local cultural organizations who can demonstrate that their projects generate economic activity, bring in tourists, and/or enhance the region's reputation. The DRPA's newfound interest in culture surely indicates the degree to which the arts have begun to seem like a good investment to regional players concerned with economic development. These interests on the part of grant-makers has given a new focus to the GPCA, which now is very much involved in creating bridges between economic development interests and cultural groups.

Seattle

Seattle's cultural institutions are of more recent origin. Whereas Philadelphia and Newark have seen their populations and economies shrink, Seattle has grown considerably in the past two decades, and its cultural offerings have expanded as well. Many of the city's performing arts organizations were founded, or built permanent halls,

⁶ The DRPA is often the source of controversy. From time to time, governors will complain that the other state is getting the lion's share of the benefits (Adams 1997). Most recently, New Jersey's newly-elected governor refused to approve the minutes of a DRPA board meeting – normally a routine matter – reviving the complaint that the agency's economic development efforts are focused on Philadelphia even though New Jersey residents pay most of the bridge tolls.

around the time of the 1962 World's Fair. The city's cultural infrastructure was concentrated around the grounds of that fair, Seattle Center, a city-owned recreational and cultural district whose most famous landmark is the Space Needle (no doubt the Frank Gehry-designed, Paul Allen-initiated Experience Music Project is by now a close second). The city's next cultural building boom took place in the 1990s, and its locus was the downtown. Within a few years, the Seattle Art Museum had relocated from a park to the outskirts of the central business district, the Symphony had built itself a new concert hall occupying a full block across from the art museum, and a well-regarded regional theater had renovated a former auditorium next door to the convention centre.

Whereas the museum's decision to locate downtown was largely internal to the organization (it began discussing downtown sites in 1979, finally beginning construction in 1985 and moving in 1991) – although aided by city funds and carried out through a quasi-public development authority – city officials and, less publicly, downtown business interests were active in persuading the symphony and the theater to consider downtown sites. Seattle never experienced the kind of decline found in Newark and Philadelphia; not only does the city have lower poverty rates and higher average incomes, but its central business district remained far more vibrant than anything found in the other cities. Nevertheless, in the early 1990s there was cause for disquiet. One major retailer, Frederick and Nelson, closed its flagship store; Nordstrom's threatened to move; office vacancy rates were high, and the downtown was dotted with vacant lots that were detritus of private development projects gone bad. Eager to staunch the decline, Mayor Norm Rice saw the city's arts institutions as perfect anchors for the edges of the central business district.

The Seattle Symphony had been promised a site at Seattle Center and a large donation by the Kreielsheimer Foundation, a local arts funder. The foundation had purchased the site at Seattle Center a decade earlier, specifically to provide a new home for the symphony, and had waited patiently for the symphony to raise the rest of the money needed to build the hall. But the mayor and several councilmembers pushed for the symphony to build on a derelict downtown site. The Kreielsheimer trustee, the head of Seattle Center, and some of the symphony's board had both emotional and practical objections to abandoning the Center in favour of downtown. (A Kreielsheimer executive recalls telling the mayor that his foundation's generous donation was "not for urban renewal" by way of explaining why it he didn't want to subsidize the costlier downtown project). Mayor Rice convened a task force to examine the site selection issue; the task force endorsed the downtown site, and the city promised to make up the difference between the costs of building at the Center and downtown. These factors persuaded the symphony to accept the downtown site for what was to become Benaroya Hall, named for developer and symphony patron Jack Benaroya. Although a considerable amount of public funds went into Benaroya Hall, and city councilmembers and other officials were active in shaping the building's design (public sector representatives were, for instance, most insistent that the square-block-long building include public spaces and retail so that it didn't present a blank wall to the daytime public), this was clearly a symphony project. The Seattle Symphony did most of the fundraising for the building, chose the architect, and is responsible for management and programming (through a closely related subsidiary, BH Music Hall Inc.).

Whereas Seattle's major arts organizations, along with the arts commissions on the county and city levels, talk about the importance of the arts to the local economy, none of these groups has taken the lead in articulating a "culture as development" argument. To the extent that such an argument has been made, it has been most cogently expressed by the Corporate Council for the Arts. Following the lead of several other cities, in the 1960s Seattle's corporate leaders had formed a united arts fund, a program through which corporate donors pool their resources and rely on a professional staff to award operating support to local arts groups. Whereas such projects had faltered in other places, in Seattle the CCA has emerged as the key player in the arts community. CCA does much more than distribute funds: it offers technical assistance, participates in advocacy campaigns (one of its officials is active in the statewide arts coalition; the group's leadership also worked effectively at the national level when the NEA was threatened in the mid-1990s), and helps promote arts groups (its website not only lists the groups it funds, but includes a calendar of its groups' events). CCA's centrality in part stems from the leadership of its president, Peter Donnelly, a former director of the Seattle Repertory Theater, who commands an astonishing degree of respect from arts administrators and corporate executives alike.

CULTURE AS DEVELOPMENT IN THREE CITIES

As cultural activities become intertwined with business and tourism promotion, local cultural policy communities could be altered in two ways. First, existing organizations may be transformed as they accommodate the re-framing of their policy

areas. Alternatively, existing organizations may remain relatively unchanged, as entirely new organizations, designed specifically to promote the arts as a development vehicle, emerge. Their creation acknowledges that “culture as development” constitutes its own policy area, and that an organization whose mission is primarily the cultivation of the arts or the development of the city’s economy can’t adequately carry out these new functions. Most likely, both scenarios will be observable, with existing organizations taking the lead in some cities, and new institutions and alliances playing a more important role in others.

Hypothesis 1: internal transformation of organizations

As nonprofit organizations, cultural groups are run by paid staff and by volunteer boards of directors; changes in organizational direction would likely be marked by new relationships in both these spheres. At the staff level, as arts institutions are conceived and promoted as vehicles for economic development, they may add departments and staff skilled in community relations, marketing and publicity; their existing top staff may become more engaged in Chambers of Commerce or downtown development partnerships. (Economic development groups may experience parallel, albeit less dramatic changes, as they add programs aimed at promoting the arts.) An examination of employment patterns at two major museums in the case study cities shows that an array of public relations, marketing and external relations activities have become more important over the past few decades.⁷ In 2000, 17.5% of the Philadelphia Museum of Art’s employees worked in marketing and public relations, up from just 2% in 1970 and 10% in 1990. During the same time frame the percentage of people employed on the

⁷ The Philadelphia and Seattle Arts Museums both report employment by category in their annual reports. Similar breakdowns are not available for the other arts institutions in the case study cities.

curatorial and restoration staffs (those who are most involved in the institution's traditional mission) fell from 38% to 27%. At the Seattle Art Museum, public relations and marketing staff increased from 5% in 1960 to 22% in 1992 and leveled off at 15% in 2000. During this period, art-related staff went from 24% to 17%. Similar patterns are evident at the Seattle Opera, where development, marketing and sales staff increased from 4 (in 1970) to 16 (in 1984) to 33 (in 2002). But the increasing concentration of staff resources on public relations functions doesn't necessarily suggest a major shift in organizational mission. In all cases, the most striking development has been the increase in staff size. Employment at the Philadelphia Museum of Art increased nearly ten-fold between 1960-2000, jumping from 222 to 404 just between 1990 and 2000. The Seattle Art Museum's staff increased from just 21 in 1960, to 195 in 1992, to 268 in 2000. Public relations functions may have grown faster than other areas, but these institutions have shown remarkable across-the-board expansion.

Anecdotal evidence garnered from interviews reinforces the idea that arts institutions have become both more entrepreneurial and more conscious of their economic role. Museum and symphony officials have talked about their increasing tendency to hire personnel specifically trained in marketing and management, and the imperative to adopt programming that will attract larger audiences and create "buzz." Such pressures, however, tend to be countered by the desire to maintain high artistic standards and retain the respect of peers in the arts (Alexander 1996). The increase in arts-trained staff at these institutions shows that concerns with marketing and economic impact have not led to wholesale shifts in organizational mission.

At the board level, one could mark the increasingly important economic function of arts institutions by studying the overlap between the boards of arts institutions and those of peak economic development agencies, such as Chambers of Commerce or other business “partnerships” that are common in American cities. Other studies have suggested that the composition of arts and other nonprofit boards can tell us much about a city’s social and political relationships (Abzug et al 1998). Whitt and Lammers (1991), for example, believe that the high degree of overlap between business promotion and arts boards in Louisville is evidence that business elites perceive the arts as a useful development tool. In contrast, they note, far fewer prominent business leaders are found on the boards of local social service agencies. Of course, arts trustees have always been drawn from among the elite, most notably the business elite. Arts institutions have understandably sought out trustees who can offer financial support; business elites have had multiple social incentives to be perceived as possessors of cultural capital. But one could argue that those members of the business community who take leadership positions on peak economic development organizations have a different, more instrumental relationship to the city’s civic institutions; their service on an arts board might be more likely to signify the perception that their work as an advocate for the business community is linked to work as an advocate for the arts community.

But the evidence that arts and business promotion boards have become more interlocked over time in these three cities is scant. Indeed, in contrast to the Louisville case (Whitt and Lammers 1991) there appears to be minimal overlap between arts and economic development boards in any time period. Between 1960-2000, the boards of the largest museum and symphony in all three cities generally shared at most two to four

board members (on boards ranging in size from 30-50 members) with these cities' Chambers and other peak business groups. This relationship didn't change over time, with two exceptions. The Downtown Seattle Association board has included more arts representatives since the 1990s, when the paid directors of the major downtown arts institutions became DSA board members. Several of these institutions built downtown homes just as the DSA had been restructured to include a broader array of downtown interests (nonprofit housing developers and social service providers have also been added to this board). And in 2000, twelve of the 43 members of the New Jersey Performing Arts Center board also sat on the boards of either the New Newark Foundation or the Newark Alliance (see below for further discussion of this case).⁸ This is evidence that, unlike the other arts organizations studied, NJPAC was conceived of as a "culture as development" project. Otherwise, changes in board overlap over time have not been striking, perhaps because board composition is subject to a number of competing trends (Abzug et al 1998).⁹

In conclusion, the hypothesis that cultural institutions have undergone internal organizational changes is only partially borne out. To be sure, arts organization directors talk about gaining a new appreciation of marketing and outreach, and programming decisions appear to reflect some of these concerns. Public relations and marketing staffs, at least at those institutions for which data are available, have grown considerably, and at

⁸ Had the 2000 board list for the Regional Business Partnership, the equivalent of a Chamber of Commerce, been available, no doubt an even greater degree of board overlap would have been found.

⁹ I had sought board lists for the major symphony and art museum, and the major peak business and downtown business association in each city at five year intervals back to 1960. Such information was not, however, always available. In many cases, the organizations simply hadn't kept annual reports or board lists. Two of the chambers of commerce refused to provide current information on board membership. It's possible that more complete information would have revealed different patterns of overlap. More likely, the findings from Louisville don't hold for more complex cities in which the larger and more heterogeneous elite strata from which board members are drawn decreases the likelihood of great overlap between the boards of a sample of organizations.

least two boards manifest a higher level of arts-economic development overlap than had been found previously. But there's no evidence, at least in these institutions, that core missions have been revised or staffing patterns radically altered in order to incorporate economic development concerns. Furthermore, at the board level we see little evidence of internal organizational change. Arts boards have always been dominated by the wealthy, many of whom are prominent in local business circles; there's no sign that the most visible business leaders have become more prominent on arts boards.

Hypothesis two: creation of new organizations

If arts institutions have not been internally transformed by their new role as economic generators, where is the infrastructure for “culture as development” located? In some cities, entirely new organizations – some built upon alliances of existing institutions, others built completely from the ground up – have been formed to formulate and implement cultural projects aimed at economic development goals.

In Newark, neither the existing cultural organizations nor the economic development organizations were much involved in launching a “culture as development” project, or engaging in its discourse. Rather, the idea of “culture as development” grew up around the creation of NJPAC, and the entire structure of the performing arts centre – the economic and civic centrality of its board, the civic involvements of its presidents, the nature of its programming – is designed to reinforce its dual role as arts mecca and revitalization catalyst. Here, then, “culture as development” is represented by an entirely new organization, one that brings together disparate constituencies (businesspeople and arts lovers; city dwellers, economic stakeholders, and suburbanites) into a new, central-

city focused economic development alliance. This alliance has been able to bring a great deal of public economic development funding to the construction of the performing arts centre.

Philadelphia had a well-established, if not always politically effective, cultural community, comprised of its many long-lived cultural institutions and its nearly 30-year old Cultural Alliance. Nonetheless, a number of new institutions were formed, mostly during the 1990s, with the support of Mayor Rendell, forming a “culture as development” policy community. Its core members are the Greater Philadelphia Tourism and Marketing Corporation, the Avenue of the Arts, Inc, the Kimmel Center, and the Convention Center as well as the re-conceived Greater Philadelphia Cultural Alliance. The projects favoured by this community could tap into funding sources not normally available for the arts. These include state and Delaware River Port Authority economic development funding, a portion of the hotel/motel tax, and certain private philanthropies. The members of this community work closely with longer standing downtown development organizations, the Central Philadelphia Development Corporation and its affiliate, the Center City District, both through some overlapping board membership and, interviews reveal, frequent staff contact. The other city cultural organizations work cooperatively with this network, sometimes by dint of participation on boards and task forces, sometimes through efforts to coordinate marketing or programming, and less frequently through joint advocacy work.

Seattle has the richest cultural infrastructure but the least institutionalized culture as development network. Seattle has no equivalent of the Greater Philadelphia Cultural Alliance; there is no formal “arts district” organization, nor does the city have its own

marketing office. Seeking out new organizations identified with “culture as development” initiatives, I came up with just a single staff person, hired in 2001 by the city’s Convention and Visitor’s Bureau to create a cultural tourism program. Although this new office appears active and effective, and many in the arts community embrace this new CVB program, his hiring hardly represents evidence of organizational transformation. To be sure, Seattle arts institutions have been the beneficiaries of generous public capital funding that was to some extent based on the notion that their new buildings would help stabilize downtown. But an entirely new organizational infrastructure, supported by new resources, is not evident.

Rather, Seattle business and political leaders have long seemed to value arts institutions as key marketing, development, and quality of life assets. The county’s hotel/motel tax has been dedicated largely to support cultural institutions since 1992,¹⁰ and in interviews arts leaders made clear that mayors and city councilmembers have been eager to champion the arts for the past twenty years at least. Support for the city’s arts institutions from the corporate community is high, seen both through generous financial support from large corporations like Boeing and, more recently Microsoft, and from long standing cooperation with business groups like the Chamber and the Downtown Seattle Association (DSA records show important downtown arts initiatives even in the 1970s). In part, Seattle’s leaders are closer to the founding or repositioning of these institutions as a boosterist project: As is true of other western cities, in Seattle business elites saw the development and maintenance of highbrow arts institutions as an important civic task. The CCA sits at the epicentre of the cultural policy community; it serves the function of

¹⁰ The first \$5.3 million collected each year goes to pay off the debt for the now demolished Kingdome; 70% of the remainder is dedicated to support King County arts groups.

bridging the worlds of business and culture, and does so effectively enough that no new “culture as development” infrastructure has thus been needed.

THREE CASES COMPARED

Several factors can help explain the different constellation of interests that mobilized to create these projects, and different trajectories the cultural policy communities have followed in these cities. First, the contrasting economic and demographic conditions of the three cities create different structural preconditions in which policy changes occur. Philadelphia and Newark had suffered dramatic economic decline. Since the civil disturbances of 1967, Newark has been one of those pariah cities shunned by investors and by the middle class. Philadelphia had not fallen quite as far, either in hard economic terms or in symbolic terms, but it was, nonetheless, a poor and decaying city. In both these cities in the 1990s, the percentage of people living below the poverty line was much higher (in Newark, more than three times higher) than the percentage of college graduates (see Table 3). New performing arts centres in these downtowns were seen as, on the one hand, far *riskier* enterprises, requiring considerable aid and confidence building from the public and philanthropic sectors. They were also far more *important* enterprises, as these declining cities had a lot (again, in both material and symbolic terms) riding on their ability to generate support for a highbrow arts project.

Table 3: Demographic indicators

	Newark	Philadelphia	Seattle
Population, 2000	273,546	1,517,550	563,374
Population change, 1980-2000 (%)	-17	- 10.4	13.6
% population white, 2000	14.2	42.5	67.9
% population black, 2000	51.9	42.6	8.3
% population Hispanic, 2000	29.5	8.5	5.3
% population with college degree, 1990	8.5	15.2	37.9
% population living in poverty, 1998 (estimate)	29.6	21.1	12.3

In Seattle, on the other hand, arts projects were brought downtown to prevent further decline, but they were never called upon to save the city. Seattle's residents and businesses had shown no signs of fleeing the city, and throughout the 1990s the region's biggest problems involved managing growth rather than stemming decline.¹¹ Seattle's well-educated, relatively well-off population, moreover, didn't need arguments about the economic benefits of arts investments to back public funding campaigns; they largely valued the city's cultural institutions for other reasons, and indeed have made that clear by backing bond referenda for the construction of the museum, Benaroya Hall, and more recently the renovation of the opera house.¹² Arts organizations that moved downtown were not taking huge risks; they did not need a new "culture as economic development" infrastructure to make their projects work.

Some of the alterations in the development and cultural policy communities have also been shaped by shifting corporate location patterns. In both Newark and Philadelphia, many of the major corporations that had formed the backbone of business association and art boards had moved, merged or gone bankrupt. Philadelphia lost more than half of its thirteen Fortune 500 headquarters between 1950 and 1980 (Hodos 2002), and its last locally-owned bank, CoreStates, merged with Charlotte-based First Union in the late 1990s. Organizations that had once been built on the resources of corporate CEOs

¹¹ Even the signs of decline were somewhat more benign in Seattle than in Philadelphia and Newark. First and Second Avenues (where the Seattle Art Museum and Benaroya Hall now sit) had been the epicenter of Seattle's small red-light district, and indeed several "adult" theaters still thrive, but they appear clean and well-maintained, and behave as good neighbors. Reportedly when SAM held a national meeting of art museum directors, the marquee of the Lusty Lady, an X-rated theater directly across from the museum, read: "Welcome Art Museum Directors!"

¹² In fact, the county-wide referendum to fund Benaroya Hall was defeated, although it won a majority of votes within the city of Seattle. City Council later allocated \$40 million to the project in "councilmanic bonds," which don't require voter approval, arguing that the voters of Seattle had made their preference clear. This generated some minor controversy. Generally, Seattle observers note, bond issues for cultural projects do well; if they are defeated it is often because they are on the ballot at the same time as other, more controversial measures, in which case they are usually approved in the next election.

now had to content themselves with boards comprised of regional vice presidents (Lemann 2000). The decline of the older generation of business elites has not necessarily resulted in a withering away of cultural institutional support; rather, the most competent of the cultural institutions have looked to new elites, and the boards of the Art Museum and most notably the Orchestra, are filled with “new money” and “new industry” representatives. But new elites may also want to create their own civic vehicles, and the new “culture as development” infrastructure in part represents this effort.

Although Seattle is seen by outsiders as a dot-com capital dominated by newly minted millionaires, in fact its civic life has been led by longer-standing elites who form the core of arts boards and donors. The city’s economy had long been based on natural resources and aerospace production (via Boeing and its many suppliers), and is used to cyclical swings, but it still relies on corporations and banks with strong local roots to support its arts programs. Interestingly, several of the largest arts supporters – Boeing and Microsoft – are actually located in nearby suburbs, but their support of Seattle-based institutions suggests that they see themselves as stakeholders in the city to a far greater degree than suburban financial service and pharmaceutical firms in the Newark and Philadelphia regions do.¹³ The elites who dominate cultural boards have been a fairly stable group, and probably not coincidentally, the management of the major arts groups has been fairly stable as well, with key arts directors in their posts for a decade or more.

¹³ Today, the biggest threat to the city’s civic institutions comes not from the dot-com crisis, but from Boeing’s decision to move its headquarters to Chicago, a financial and psychological slap in the face to the city. Boeing, which still has huge operations in the area, has assured the city’s leaders that it will continue to maintain its level of philanthropic and board support even from Chicago, but this is unlikely to be the case in the long run.

Often changes in policy communities come about via changes in personnel, but in Seattle such pressures have not been present.

Political structures and political culture also help explain the differences between these cities. Newark is a small city with a subdued political life – Sharpe James has served as mayor, virtually without challenge, for 16 years. With its strong mayor system, dearth of grassroots activism, and small group of dominant business leaders, the city’s political culture has become quite personalistic, and the city’s big economic development and cultural projects more reliant on relationships between top political and business leaders than on group activity. Philadelphia shares the strong mayor system, which explains why Ed Rendell was so pivotal in mobilizing resources for the creation of Avenue of the Arts projects. But Philadelphia is larger and more complex than Newark, with entrenched development authorities and long-standing art organizations that can’t be induced to change direction simply because they mayor wants them to. Much of the “culture as development” infrastructure was established at Rendell’s behest, and run by those in his inner circle who were impatient with the ability of existing arts and development institutions to take on these new tasks.

Seattle is governed by an at-large, nonpartisan council whose power rivals the mayor’s. Mobilizing support behind a project is therefore more complex – one can’t simply engage in the sort of localistic log-rolling (e.g. support my downtown concert hall and I’ll support your neighbourhood park) that greases the wheels of deliberation in other polities. Seattle elites often spoke, sometimes ironically, of the “Seattle Way;” a characteristic of local political culture that, in its most positive form stresses cooperation and the search for common ground (and in its most negative form results in dysfunctional

conflict avoidance and inertia). Seattle politicians and interest groups have a great deal of experience crafting coalitions around new ideas, and apparently don't need to establish a new organizational infrastructure with which to do it. And the arts are not a hard sell in Seattle. The well-educated, well-off population "votes" for culture through their high rates of attendance at performing arts events, and through their support for the many referenda through which public funds have been raised for arts institutions.¹⁴ In short, the pressures – external pressures such as severe threats to downtown property values, internal pressures such as the decline of traditional civic elites -- that have led political and business leaders in Newark and Philadelphia to embrace (and cultural leaders to accept) the creation of a new "culture as development" institutional infrastructure have been lacking in Seattle.

SUMMARY

In all three cities, performing arts centres and other cultural institutions have been built downtown, at least in part with the goal of revitalizing their cities. The adoption of such "culture as development" policies grows out of the needs of city boosters, who are eager to attract tourists and improve their cities' images through association with highbrow arts projects. They also meet the needs of arts administrators, who welcome the infusion of capital funds and see advantages in linking their missions to those of city marketers. These shared goals and interests are manifested in the emergence of new alliances and organizational structures that unite business promotion, place marketing, and cultural support. Although we see similar alliances and discourses in all three cases, however, the organizational infrastructure for "culture as development" differs from city

¹⁴ In contrast, in Philadelphia, professional sports have a far greater following than the arts – indeed, the ballet's recent advertising campaign has tried to attract Philadelphians by comparing the skills of its dancers with those of professional hockey and football players.

to city. In a relatively affluent city like Seattle, arts advocates are confident that cultural institutions can bring benefit to the city just by doing what they've always done – providing the best visual art, theatre, or symphonic music – but on a larger scale in a more central location. In cities with declining economies, in contrast, efforts to use culture as an economic development tool has generated a new organizational infrastructure that mobilizes new resources.

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